Abstract This paper evaluates the arguments presented regarding the interpretation of false pleasures in Plato's Philebus during the past 50 years. As the central axis of the debate is the concept of propositional attitude, I will tell the story of the propositional interpretation of the passage to show how and why it was constructed to become seemingly obvious, irrefutable, and even Platonic in its origin. Besides this, the paper raises the following problems for the propositional interpretation: (i) if it has textual basis and (ii) if it is necessary to understand the passage or if it is an obstacle and should be abandoned so that the Platonic text could be read in a non-anachronistic way.
Introduction
In 1959, J. Gosling published his seminal "False Pleasures: Philebus 35c-41b,"
triggering an endless debate on a subject that had seemed sterile: the issue of false pleasures. Plato somewhat anticipated, not without some pleasure, this controversy when he makes Socrates say to Protarchus, at 36d, in the introduction of this theme in the dialogue: "We are starting a discussion that will be anything but small." This prediction, however, was not fully met until Gosling´s article came into the hands of his peers. But what would have been the substance injected by Gosling into Plato's text to bring to life a subject that had been so well buried? It was a new drug that makes the Platonic text speak, not in that obscure language that his critics disliked, but in a way so clear and simple that we could swear it came from a text of Gilbert Ryle1 1 or Bernard Williams.
After 50 years of intense controversy about false pleasures in the Philebus, maybe now we can evaluate some arguments in this debate. As the discussion has taken as * For research support, I thank CAPES for the grant I received to do post-doctoral research at Brown University. I would also like to thank David Konstan and Mary-Louise Gill for their constructive feedback during our discussions, as well as Boris Nikolsky and George Rudebusch. 1 G. E.M. Anscombe: "The concept of pleasure (...) had hardly seemed a problematic one at all to modern philosophers until Ryle reintroduced it as a topic a year or two ago." (1957, p.76) .
For discussion see Bravo (1995) .
understanding of the insertion of Philebus into the context of a large discussion on pleasure opened by Ryle. Gosling never mentions directly the theoretical background of his interpretation, but a mere look at Williams´s paper gives us the clues to the presuppositions of Gosling's view. In the example that opens Williams´s article, the Philebus is the immediate reference: "I may be pleased because (as I suppose) I have inherited a fortune, when I have not" (p. 57). This example inspired by Plato will take us straight to the problem of anticipatory pleasure and to the relation between pleasure and opinion ("our present concern here is with the problems of belief and knowledge in relation to pleasure" p. 68). That's the question of Williams's article. And answering the question, Williams introduces a decisive distinction for the future of the interpretation of Plato's passage on false pleasures 6 . It is presented in relation to a painting by Giorgione 7 :
(GI) "I may be pleased at x, but say that I am pleased at y because I falsely believe that x is y;"
(GII) "I may take pleasure in, or be pleased by, x which I mistakenly think is y, where x's supposedly being y is the basis of my pleasure. Thus, I may be pleased by this supposed Giorgione as being a Giorgione. " (p. 66) In the first case, the falsities of opinion don't affect my pleasure, "because x's being y is no element in my pleasure. Thus, I may be pleased by this picture, as a picture, and say that I am pleased by this Giorgione, when the picture is not a Giorgione." In the second case, the situation is completely different because the "discovery of the truth will mean (...) the end of pleasure -at least, of that pleasure" (p.66). This would be similar to the case of "my supposed inheritance of a fortune," which means "be pleased at something that does not exist at all" (p. 66).
6 Williams (1959) , nonetheless, never attributes the distinction of pleasure of anticipation and the anticipation of pleasure to Plato. On the contrary, he says, p. 69, quoting Philebus 39d seq.: "for the pleasures of anticipation consist in the anticipation of pleasure." 7 The mysterious Renaissance painter Giorgione, also known as Barbarelli, was famous for his gifts. There is uncertainty about the authenticity of works attributed to him. Giorgione made his first appearance in a philosophical scene in Quine's book O Sentido da Nova Lógica, published in Brazil in 1944 and written in Portuguese. Bernard William's distinction is clearly inspired by Quine's example. Now, we can return to Gosling's alternative account. As we have said, he was searching for the "intimate connection" between pleasure and belief. And now we can say that this search is for the Giorgione II -that is, a case like Gosling's sentence GII above -in the text. Only a Giorgione II could show the logical necessity that makes pleasure depend on opinion. This process that I call "hanging a Giorgione" is the fabrication in the Platonic text of a distinction that we cannot find explicitly in it. That´s what Gosling was looking for when he discusses "what Plato is getting at in the analogy of pleasure and belief." Socrates' investigation begins with an analogy. It is easy to see that the analogy is based on Protarchus' admission that beliefs are true or false. That's why Socrates is going to construct a parallel to transpose the condition of belief to pleasure. The analogy between pleasure (hedone) and belief (doxa) can be schematically put in the following way: Gosling based his analysis of this analogy upon two words: orthotes ("rightness")
There is such a thing as believing (doxazein). 37a2-3 1´. There is such a thing as enjoying (hedeisthai). 37a5 2. [In cases of believing] there is something believed (to doxazomenon
and harmartanein ("to miss the mark"). Established by these key words, this similarity places pleasure and opinion in a symmetrical relation. The strategy was supposed to work with Protarchus, but failed to convince him. But, according to Gosling, what Plato is trying to get with the analogy is "that anticipatory pleasure is taken (...) from supposed information about the pleasures to come" and that it is "the correctness of this information that is directly responsible for the "truth" and "falsity" of the pleasure" (p. Thus Socrates introduces another analogy: between the soul and a book. And we move from belief to picture. In the second analogy, after describing a perceptual situation when somebody sees something appearing at a distance and tries to identify it, Socrates compares the soul to a book: The combination of memory and sense experience writes sentences in the soul; sometimes what they write is true, sometimes false. Besides the writer, there is also a painter "who paints pictures in accordance with the logos" and that which is painted may be past, present and future. The pictures take place "in the absence of direct experience which is the subject of logos" (p. 51).
This 'painting' analogy is decisive to Gosling's reading. The "zoographos
[painter] passage," he says, is not "irrelevant." Plato is saying "a little more than" the DV
reading. But what does Gosling see as essential to anticipatory pleasure in the passage?
With this analogy, Socrates obtains the admission of Protarchus that pictures of false beliefs are themselves false. But why does the analogy of soul to book lead Protarchus to accept that some pleasures are false? Gosling's answer is based on a supposed ambiguity.
As the truth or falsity of the pictures depends on the logoi of which they are pictures, Gosling supposes that for Plato "the pleasure and the picture are run together, and the picture of a pleasure and the pleasure of a picture taken to be the same." Gosling thinks that Protarchus accepts this conflation. In sum, "anticipatory pleasures can be said to be correct or incorrect, right or mistaken, because they are in fact pictures, and pictures, when based on beliefs, can be incorrect or mistaken, and so false." When the relation between the pictures and beliefs is explained, Protarchus could accept the truth or falsity of the pictures. "Belief infects the pictures", as Socrates says, with their condition. Since they are based on beliefs, their truth or falsity is derivative. ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 In the conclusion of his article, Dybikowiski made a special contribution to the Propositional Interpretation. He termed the question about the plausibility of Plato´s 8 "While Gosling and Kenny (1960) see the argument as turning on a conflation of... picture and picturing, Dybikowski (1970) makes it depend on a conflation of picture and object depicted, together with a further conflation of the object depicted (a pleasure) with the pleasure of depicting that object (p. 440). According to Kenny (1960) , Protarchus is convinced by an argument that takes the truth in another sense: "Bad men enjoy largely false pleasures, while good men enjoy true ones." Protarchus would be induced to admit that a pleasure may be false by considering the case of false belief held by a wicked man who is picturing a future pleasure" (p. 9). False belief here should not be understood in terms of a misclassification of an event [to receive or not a fortune]. In the case of the man looking forward to receiving a fortune, the false belief is not the belief that he will get the money" but it "is the belief that he will enjoy these activities." 9 According to Kenny (1960) , Protarchus is convinced by an argument that takes the truth in another sense: "Bad men enjoy largely false pleasures, while good men enjoy true ones." Protarchus would be induced to admit that a pleasure may be false by considering the case of false belief held by a wicked man who is picturing a future pleasure" (p. 9). False belief here should not be understood in terms of a misclassification of an event [to receive or not a fortune]. In the case of the man looking forward to receiving a fortune, the false belief is not the belief that he will get the money" but it "is the belief that he will enjoy these activities." 10 About the crucial passage on imagination, Dybikovski (1970) recognizes that if we take what Plato says in the passage literally at 40b6-7, he is giving false pleasures painted. Thus, the falsity is attributed to the anticipated pleasures, and not, as expected, the pleasures of anticipation. Socrates has therefore made a mistake, "instead of claiming that the pleasure taken in the picture is false, he makes the claim about the pictured pleasure." (p. 165) But the mistake permits Protarchus to agree with the conclusion: he accepts that the pleasure is false because it has already accepted that the pleasures of evil are false paintings. "But neither Socrates nor Protarchus see that a very different claim has to be established in order to show that there can be false pleasures." (p. 165) ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 defending anachronistic positions irrelevant. Although he concludes that Plato is mistaken, he thinks that Plato was "moving in fresh directions" in his account of pleasure and belief, so that "this account need not carry any logical commitment to Plato´s general theory of pleasure and that, in consequence, it can be detached from it, whether Plato would be willing to follow such a lead or not"
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. It all depends on our contemporary philosophical interest. "For it is not the general theory of pleasure which is of interest to the modern philosopher so much as Plato´s acknowledgement that belief plays an important role in the analysis of the concept of pleasure and his use of it to map a relation between pleasure and desire." In sum: if we could apply the Giorgione distinction to
Plato´s passage, we don´t need to connect the passage with Plato´s philosophy anymore, because we can suppose that he was moving in fresh directions. Coincidently and fortunately, as we are going to see, he was moving to meet-and please-our own expectations...
One significant point of Gosling -this time co-authoring a book with Taylor -in
The Greeks on Pleasure, is a change of vocabulary in relation to Gosling's first articles.
Gosling and Taylor describe what is called false in terms either of "some enjoyment" or "a propositional attitude." A propositional attitude is characterized by the expression "... is pleased that p." For them, "if this is what Plato is talking about and not enjoyments, then we can readily see how falsity of the sort attributed to beliefs could be attributed to such an attitude" (p. 429). Gosling and Taylor recorded that, at that time, 1982, a tendency in the analysis of the passage was gaining ground, namely, the propositional interpretation of false pleasures. This new trend reads Gosling (1982 ) against Gosling (1959 , eliminating "ambiguities," "conflations," "errors," and "mistakes" which, in one way or another, he and his followers attributed to Plato. Accepting Dybikowski´s suggestion of detaching the passage of Platonic account of pleasure and showing in the text devices that make possible the idea that Plato was aware of the distinction of 11 This idea is behind Frede's conviction is that Plato thought that "a revision of the ontology of pleasures should be made; and I see this as one of the main objectives in the Philebus" (1985, p. 176) . The "fresh start" of Dybikovsky became "fresh ground" to Frede ("The Philebus thus breaks fresh ground" (p. 161)) or even "fresh start" ("Plato makes a fresh start in the Philebus"(p. 161)). The revision in question is a revision of "the concept of true and false pleasures in Rep. IX" and of the doctrine of "the degrees of reality" to which it is tied. But what is missing in Rep. IX? Frede has no difficult in answering: "the propositional sense of true" (1985, p. 160-1) . ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 Williams's Giorgione, the interpretation in terms of Propositional Pleasure thereby establishes the canonical interpretation of the false pleasures.
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This tendency started in 1962. Shortly after the publication of the articles of Gosling and Bernard Williams, Thalberg publishes an enthusiastic "interpretation" of the passage, although far away from the text of the Philebus. There, his aim was to "explain Plato's view of false pleasure and answer the more obvious objections to it (...) and (...)
argue that his strange doctrine illuminates the neglected propositional aspect of the moods we characterize as "enjoyment," "amusement," or "pleasure." His "presumptions" are based, not surprisingly, on Ryle. "Professor Ryle," he says, "has demonstrated that these nouns and their corresponding verbs, do not apply to sensations or any kind of neural process" (p. 65). But Ryle, according to Thalberg, left "untouched the residue of fascinating expressions" (Ex. "John is pleased [or thrilled, or overjoyed, or delighted, or satisfied, or content] that his enemies died of a heart attack"). In the Philebus, Thalberg found "an illuminating rapprochement between this family of phrases about pleasure (the seeming non-cognitive state) and a family of cognitive-sounding idioms: 'anticipating (expecting, fearing, hoping, believing) that'." According to Thalberg, the Platonic thesis "is a simple one": "When Jones is convinced that he is (or will be) the winner of the Irish Sweepstakes, but his number doesn't come up, we call his belief false. Therefore, if Jones declared, 'I'm delighted that I won,' why shouldn't we say that he was mistaken -that his pleasure was false?" (p. 66) For Thalberg, in Protarchus's "analysis" of the relation between pleasure and belief, "it sounds as if the two elements of such a mental state were completely separable, like the melting of a piece of wax and the heating that precedes it" (p. 67). Thalberg attributes to Protarchus a causal connection between belief and pleasure.
"But surely, he says, there is no logical connection between believing and being delighted that one has triumphed in the Sweepstakes". As we can see, Thalberg is still looking for the "intimate connection" between pleasure and belief and thought that he found this 12 Thalberg explicitly talks about Quine´s objections to the concept of propositional attitudes: "I admit, he says, the difficulties that Professor Quine ascribes to the analysis of propositional ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 Despite the vagueness of Thalberg's interpretation and the striking absence of 
This Giorgione pleases me (this is ambiguous, since it may be read as either of the following) This painting is a Giorgione, and it pleases me This painting is a Giorgione and it, being a Giorgione, pleases me. (167-8)
This difference Williams points to is that the painting being a Giorgione is "within the scope of my being pleased when 'this Giorgione' is read as in (3), whereas when read as in (2) it does little more than help me pin an identificatory tag upon the painting which is the object of my pleasure." Penner thinks that the fact that Plato speaks of "certain beliefs 'infecting' certain 'pleasures' seems prima facie grounds for saying that it was indeed this distinction that Plato was after in his discussion of false anticipatory pleasures" (p. 167, my italics) 13 . Penner nonetheless recognizes that just to say that Plato was after this distinction is not enough to reach an interpretation of the passage. He thinks that "he can do better than this" and "better than any of those recent treatments of the passage which have been aware of the distinction of Williams" (p. 167), Gosling attitudes. A statement describing a pleasure that is a propositional attitude -for instance, "Mr Jones is pleased that Mr Jones's horse won the handicap' -is referentially opaque…" (p. 73) 13 For convenience, Frede (1985, p.166 ) mistranslated "anepimplasan" in 42a10, by "affect" and criticizes the correct translation by "infect": "Gosling (…) and Kenny (…) translate it by "infect", but that might be too weak because this may just means that they have an impact while a merger seems rather to be what Plato has in mind." Her translation by "affect" (1993, ad loc) is an attempt to eliminate the obvious difficulty that the text offers to propositional interpretation. ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 included. What is necessary to do that is "demonstrating Plato´s insights. Merricks (2009, p. 231) : "Apparently, the contingent and conventional Grammar of English does not dictate the metaphysics of how a thinking agent is related to propositions" 15 "Machinery" is the word that Penner (1970a) applies to interpretations before his. 16 Penner (1970a, p. 175) : "All of these devices are natural ones for the relation I have characterized as 'phi-ing in p'." ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 distinction? According to Penner, "It is in the recognition of the analogy between being ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 not so obvious that Snow White´s evil stepmother could take pleasure from propositions. . One conclusion of these discussions is "that when the content of a fear or desire cannot be fully expressed by using a that-clause, that fear or desire is not a propositional attitude"
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. More incisively, Trenton Merricks does not deny the existence of propositional attitudes as beliefs, but affirms that "fears and desires are never propositional attitudes, not even when we can fully express the content of the relevant fear or desire by using a that-clause" (p. 209). 27 "We do not fear propositions, not as
Giorgione distinction] for developments of Fregean semantics and the Fregean theory of existence and the existential quantifier," and note 6, pp. 169-170, where he mentions his article "Verbs and the Identity of Actions" (which deals with process-product ambiguities) in a volume on Ryle (1970b ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 some fear dogs", he says (p. 213). It would be pathological for anyone to fear a proposition "as he fears that a tiger will attack him." Proposition are abstract objects and "no one should really fear any abstract object (...) Jones does not fear any proposition in the way that he fears that a tiger will attack him" (p. 214).
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But let's ignore the problems and suppose with Frede that propositional pleasure is a non-problematic concept. Let's suppose that "everything is, 'logically speaking,'
above board" and take seriously another rhetorical question of Frede's: "Why does
Socrates not explain in a more direct way that some pleasures consist in logoi or pictures?" Frede asks herself this relevant question but offers us a disappointing answer:
"His reasons are mainly psychological." 28 In reality, Frede has found her justification not in the Platonic text, but in her "wishful thinking" that Plato should have thought that propositional pleasures are "intellectually most interesting since they concern the logical sense of truth and falsity" (1985, p. 177-8) . Once more it is Giorgione's distinction and the search for "the intimate connection" 29 that is at work backstage. As Frede said, Bernard Williams' article "has inspired all interpretations that have been sympathetic to 'propositional pleasures'"(p.178 n. 49).
Against this idea, Mooradian has already shown that Socrates is always talking about pleasures that come with false belief, not only in the crucial passage, 37e, when he provokes Protarchus' reaction, but also in 38a ("the pleasures that come with true belief") and 38b ("pleasures and pain often follow true and false belief"). There is no evidence in . He suggests that
Protarchus is expressing the same view of aisthesis presented in the first part of
Theaetetus:
Pleasure cannot be false because it is a kind of aesthesis, and aisthesis is always correct in relation to its object. In fact, there is a "striking similarity," as he says, between the description of pleasures and pains, desires, and fears as incorrigible states of awareness (aisthesis) and Protarchus' claim that only belief can be false, not pleasures and pains, fears and expectations. Mooradian pointed out that "commentators have failed to notice this similarity because they have thought Socrates meant to signal other propositional attitudes by including fears and expectations into the range of possible false mental states. But this assumption is unwarranted." 35 Mooradian's more attractive and Platonic alternative is to assume "that Protarchus held that pleasure cannot be true or false because it is not a representational state", that we could see him "as advancing the relativistic thesis of Theaetetus that the object cannot fail to be pleasurable if the agent takes pleasure in it".
31 Thalberg, p. 67 32 For the attribution of a Humean view to Protarchus, see Mooradian (1996) . 33 Mooradian (p. 94) 34 One important point about Protarchus, linked to the Epiphenomenalist thesis, is that Propositionalists think that he is commonsensical person, expressing a naïve conception, a spontaneous view. But, on the contrary, Protarchus seems to be defending a theoretical point of view (even though he wasn't the most competent man to defend it). When Protarchus replies that he is only saying what he hears (38a), this is a strong indication that Protarchus is expressing the philosophical thesis that Plato means to develop and criticizes". 35 Mooradian (1996) , 105-6.
Mooradian's alternative thesis is behind two recent and important attempts to escape from the aporia of Giorgione´s distinction. Verity Harte says (p.120 n. 6) that her conclusion is "similar to Mooradian although we differ over how [Socrates] gets there."
But she still agrees "with those commentators who take Socrates to portray the pleasures he takes to be capable of falsity as propositional attitudes" (p. 120). Harte knows very well that it is difficult to defend the "generally held" view that Socrates' false pleasure is of William's type ("pleasure is false -it is generally held-when expectations of acquiring the gold are not fulfilled" p. 124). And she correctly thinks that images "should not be identified with attitudes," but to keep the propositional law working, she assumes that "logoi and images are involved in our having such attitudes" [my italics]. Unfortunately, she doesn't explain what this involvement is exactly. As Dybikovski says, all we want to know is how we go from the logoi to the pictures, or how we pass from belief to affect, The first passage, fundamental for understanding the position Socrates is trying to defend, is "the only typical case that Plato gives of the thing he has in mind," as Gosling says in his first article. Inserted in the middle of argumentation of false pleasure, the accepts what Gosling said in his first account about the zoographos passage: It should not be read as "an embellishment, picturesque perhaps, but irrelevant, which complicates what was intended as a simple picture." But as we have shown, it was exactly in trying to make sense of the zoographos passage that Gosling's interpretation collapsed. Delcomminette, trying to understand the passage in the context of Platonic thought, found the same old Giorgione obstacle: "Mais comment passer de cette fausseté du plasir anticipé à la fausseté du plaisir d´anticipation lui-même? Socrate n´explicite pas cette transition: Il se contente d´attribuer la possibilité de la fausseté au plaisir paint (cp. 40b6-7)." Delcomminette recognizes the problem: "On pourrait rétorquer que c´est bien plutôt cette distinction qui est erronée: en effect le plaisir d´anticipation n´est rien d´autre que l´anticipation d´un plaisir." (2006, p. 389-390) . Delcomminette can't follow this line of thought because he is committed to the idea that the question of falsity is directly linked to the "propositional content" of doxa (v. 2003, p. 217) and "la dépendence causale de la fausseté de l'image à l'égard de celle de la doxa (2006, 362 n.23 ).
And so we are taken back to the Gorgione aporia. Against Mooradian and the idea that Protarchus is defending a Protagorean thesis, Delcomminette says that appearance is essentially different from mere perception since it supposes that perception is "mixed," that is to say, structured by doxa. But strangely, he assumes that at Theaethetus 152b12 an identity between phainetai and aisthanetai is posited, which becomes at 152c1 an identity between phantasia and aisthesis. Now, Delcomminette accepts that "this identity results from Protagoras' position and can in no way be ascribed to Plato himself" (n.17 223 Let´s take a look at the rejected example.
In 40a, Protarchus agrees that every man is full of many expectations and that there are in us logoi that we call expectations, and Socrates adds:
There are, above all (kai de kai), painted appearances (ta phantasmata ezographemena). For example, when somebody often sees (hora) gold in profusion (aphthonon) coming to him, and with the gold multiple (pollas) pleasures; and, particularly (kai de kai), when he watches (kathora) himself in the painting enjoying himself excessively (sphodra).
The example is evidently centered in direct visualization of the painting. And there is a clear change of focus from the logoi to the phantasma introduced by the adverbial expression "kai de kai." In the soul there are logoi that we call expectations, and also painted phantasmata (appearances). The present indicative verb hora, he sees, in relation to a phantasma seen, recreates the situation of perception similar to that described in 38d (when somebody frequently sees (idonti) an apparition (phantazomenon). The two parallel situations give us the key to understand the example.
The similarity has, nonetheless, one fundamental asymmetry. In the external visualization of the phantasma, the appearance is not clear (me saphos) giving space for an attempt to discern what the appearance is. The doxa results from this effort, and logos makes it possible to express the doxa. In the internal visualization, on the other hand, the painted appearance doesn't provoke any doubt 43 and comes after a logos that in turn results from a conjunction of memory, perception (aisthesis) and associated feelings (pathemata).
This internal experience of anticipatory pleasure has as a model the external experience of perception. This fact rules out any attempt to transform the introspection of the painted phantasma into a "being pleased that" or any kind of propositional attitude. In her effort the adventure) should be changed: e.g., the schoolboy falsely enjoys "eating up the headmaster´s favorite dessert" (falsely, because it is not the favorite dessert…). Frede (1985) To understand the function of logoi in the structure of the introspection passage, we should understand it in relation to the corresponding example of external perception (38c5-e7). Externally, logos appear as the last link in a chained series: visionphantasma -belief -logos (spoken). In the internal series (that gives continuity to the external in the reversed form) we have: (aisthesis + memory + pathemata) -logoi (written) -belief -phantasma -vision. They are mirror images. But logoi, as the text shows, are products of a stochastic activity: its truth or falsity depends on chance (if it hits the mark); there is no rational justification for these logoi as true or false logoi, although by hypothesis we can suppose this possibility. But why do logoi come in first place, before images, in the internal series? We know that in external perception logoi come from the phantasmata, after a process of decision; in the internal perception, on the other hand, there is no room for rational or stochastic decision. The soul is submitted to the writings and images that come from the outside, from the sensible world. All logoi are written by aisthesis and memory (which is mere conservation of aisthesis) and pathemata As we can see, the premise of the theophileis is essential for the conversion of
Protarchus, but what do Propositionalists say about it? A good example is Delcomminette. He says "I shall not say a single word about the puzzling passage 39e8-40c3." (p. 216 n. 2). His reason is predictable: "the epistemological aspect," he says, "can be understood relatively independent of the rest." But we can't see how a successful interpretation of the argument can ignore one premise as unnecessary. Likewise Frede doesn't discuss it probably because she thinks with Gosling that the theophileis passage is a "moralistic digression" (p. 111)
44
.
One of the few interpreters that face the "unexpected remark" with some attention is Kenny (p. 50): "Bad men, then, enjoy largely false pleasures, while good men enjoy true ones. Hence we conclude that there are false pleasures in the minds of men," he says and asks, "Why this reference to the wicked man?" He correctly sees that we have to decide about the meaning of false to understand what a false doxa is. If it is a "false belief that an event will take place" (in the case of the example of a "man looking forward to receiving a fortune"), we have to answer: "why should the good man be more likely to be correct in his belief than the wicked man. that the text offers; should take the theophileis passage not as a digression, but as an integral part of the argument; and should show how it (false pleasure of anticipation) is related to the global strategy of the dialogue and, doing this, answer why it is decisive to the final judgment of the dialogue. In relation to the last point, it is important to remember that in 32c, when the question of anticipation (prosdokia) is introduced by Socrates, he says that it is in relation to this kind of pleasure and pain that the central question of the dialogue is going to be answered: if the genus pleasure will be welcome as a whole, or sometimes yes, sometimes not. And he adds: "Pleasure and pain--such as hot and cold, etc.--are not good in themselves but can take on in certain circumstances the nature of the good." This is evidence that, since the beginning of Socrates' exposition of false anticipatory pleasure, ethical and metaphysical aspects of pleasure are related and projected in the passage.
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notions and both are grounded on an ontological sense (...) For it is the idea of the falseness of an inadequate imitation that suggests how the pleasure of the would-be rich man is false (...) The good man is good in the sense of being just and pious and thus is called "a friend of the gods"."
